Closing the Mind Gap
Ted Cadsby
BPS Books, 2014
ISBN 978 1 927483 78 7
£18.00
China Miéville sets one of his novels, The City & the City, in two cities occupying the same physical space. Citizens of each city, partly through choice and partly through political coercion, have trained themselves to ‘unsee’ the other city: to recognize the buildings and inhabitants of the other city without seeing them. Crossing the cognitive divide, even by accident, is regarded as ‘breaching’ – a terrible crime invoking unspeakable punishments.
Ted Cadsby, in his ambitious and enjoyable new book, similarly invokes two coterminous worlds. We live in both, but usually recognise only one. The consequences of ignoring the other can be profoundly damaging.
World #1 is, in his description, ‘straightforward’. In World #1, we easily differentiate meaningful signals from noise; patterns are consistent across different situations; feedback is direct, timely and clear. In World #1, learning is easy and prediction is reliable. World #1 is the world “in which countless generations of our ancestors lived and in which we continue to spend much of our time.”
World #2 is ‘complex’. In World #2, signals are buried in noise; patterns vary across situations because each situation is unique; feedback on our actions is indirect, delayed and ambiguous. World #2 has, Cadsby suggests, “snuck up on us”, principally in the evolutionary blink of an eye that witnessed the Industrial and Information Revolutions.
The farmers of World #1 could reliably expect their predictions to turn out correctly (except, presumably, when they didn’t); the knowledge workers of World #2, in contrast, “cannot rely on simple cues and timely feedback to make decisions.”
Cadsby argues that our brains have evolved to navigate World #1 and are unprepared for World #2. In fact, we have, figuratively, two brains: the ‘old’ brain, which operates unconsciously, and the ‘new’ brain, which has evolved over the past 100,000 years and which we think of as conscious. We think automatically with the ‘old’ brain, and effortfully with the ‘new’ one. But the partnership is unequal: the ‘new’ brain has limited access to the ‘old’ one. As a result of this ‘brain-brain’ gap, the way we think is not always matched to our modern world, and so we face the second challenge of a ‘brain-world’ gap.
The challenge is to close the gaps.
Cadsby’s book works with an explanatory narrative of human cognition that has developed 
rapidly over the past decade or two. The ‘left-brain-right-brain’ narrative of the 70s and 80s has gradually given way to an ‘intuition-and-rationality’ narrative, under the influence of psychology, complexity science, evolutionary anthropology, cognitive science and what’s loosely referred to as neuroscience. Paul MacLean's model of the triune brain helped get the narrative going; Guy Claxton’s Hare Brain, Tortoise Mind, Stephen Mithen’s The Prehistory of the Mind and Chris Frith's Making Up the Mind have all made interesting contributions.
Like its predecessor, the ‘intuition/rationality’ narrative relies on a satisfyingly simple dichotomy. Where the earlier explanation concentrated on a lateral division between left and right brain, the new one emphasizes a vertical division, the ‘new’ brain (represented by the neocortex) sitting on top of the ‘old’, intuitive, emotional brain (represented mostly by the hippocampus and the amygdala).
This new narrative has considerable explanatory power. Cadsby argues that “our minds are meaning-making machines”: we predict the nature of reality by intuitively pattern-matching to pre-existing mental models, some inherited (like the ability to recognize a face), some learned (like the ability to ride a bike). ‘Constructive realism’ is useful in World #1 because in this world the pattern-matches are usually more or less accurate; but in World #2, constructive realism falls prey to “greedy reductionism”: we oversimplify complexity and conclude overconfidently.
Type 1 thinking, intuitive and automatic, will help us solve straightforward problems, but not complex ones. It will help us read a novel but not write one; eat a meal but not cook it; watch tennis but not play it. If we want to understand complexity more effectively, we need to invoke Type 2 thinking.
The catch is that Type 2 thinking requires concentration. Where Type 1 is quick, Type 2 must be slow; where Type 1 operates in parallel, Type 2 can operate only one task at a time. Much of the book is devoted to the strategies necessary to develop Type 2 thinking: study the problem landscape more carefully; pursue missing information; analyse causal relationships; and so on. Cadsby suggests that we need to develop two types of Type 2 thinking: Type 2.1, which helps us model complexity more accurately; and Type 2.2, thinking about thinking, which “brings us as thinking agents into the process of thinking”. Cadsby calls Type 2.2 ‘metacognition’ and, with a Buddhist inflection, ‘mindfulness’.
But we’re not inclined to do either. We prefer Type 1 thinking. For one thing, effortful thinking requires – well – effort, and we need to conserve cognitive energy. Worse still, we’re addicted to certainty: we need to know, we need to be in control, and we’re desperate to enjoy the calm, pleasurable (intuitive) feeling of knowing that we have figured something out. Ambiguity and doubt create too much discomfort.
Closing the Mind Gap develops this thesis in great detail. Cadsby synthesises huge quantities of information and explains it elegantly. This may not be quite a popular science book and it may not be quite a management book; but it's certainly a page-turner. Cadsby is much influenced by Daniel Kahnemann (Thinking Fast and Slow), although he also cites the work of Robin Hogarth, Nassim Nicholas Taleb and Keith Stanovich, along with a host of experimental evidence to support his argument. Along the way, he offers excellent accounts of theory of mind, the workings of the emotions, Bayesian probability theory and much more. For anybody interested in understanding why we so often fail to think as well as we can, this book will be useful (though I wish his endnotes indicated his sources more precisely).
And yet, and yet. Something bothers me.
To begin with, I’m not sure about these two worlds. How do we distinguish #1 from #2? Are they not both simply mental constructs? After all, as Cadsby himself says: “our earliest forms of conscious awareness enabled language, culture and innovation, and we began to create a new world for ourselves.” We find ourselves paradoxically limited in our ability to understand the cognitive complexity that we ourselves have generated.
And then, understanding complexity is never the whole story. The primary function of a brain is to enable an organism to move. If “all life is problem solving” – as Karl Popper suggested – then, as Cadsby points out, “the brain interprets its environment so it can motivate actions that are conducive to thriving.” Or, to quote José Ortega y Gasset: “Living is a constant process of deciding what we are going to do.” The truth, however complex, matters less than the solution, which is not an answer but an intervention in the world.
Cadsby touches on decision-making. He discusses the Taylor-Russell diagram; and he acknowledges, entertainingly, the provisional quality of all decisions. But his advice on how to decide better is somewhat negative: we should qualify our conclusions with ‘probably not’, ‘could be’ or ‘it appears to me that...’ I’d like more emphasis on how to choose what to do, and how to manage risk.
Perhaps Cadsby has picked up Kahnemann’s pessimism, along with the undoubted insights of behavioural economics. It seems that that the best we can do is overcome – effortfully – our inevitable cognitive shortcomings. For example, we read a lot about confirmation bias, availability bias and myside bias, but nothing about optimism bias: the tendency to assume that everything will turn out ok, which becomes a useful learning tool when surprised by failure or the unexpected. (I’d like to see more in the book about learning.) Rather than celebrating our successes in combining Type #1 and Type #2 thinking – in collaborative research, artistic production, business and diplomacy – Cadsby invokes the quietism of Stoicism and Buddhism to help us outmanoeuvre Type 1 thinking and the depressing negativity bias of our emotions. (“The marginal value of eating and sex declines rapidly once we have had our fill, but the marginal value of avoiding danger never declines.” Hm. )
What’s missing?
The clue may be in the ‘cultural big bang’ that Cadsby describes early in the book. It’s a critical part of the narrative. This was the moment, perhaps 50,000 years ago, when human 
consciousness seemed to take a sudden leap forward, “fuelled by the ... ability to communicate complex ideas and generalize learning by applying insight from one task to different ones.” Something happened to our thinking; something that allowed us to transcend the difference between Type 1 and Type 2 thinking and combine them; something that offered us the opportunity, not merely to generalise, but to create wholly new ideas. Cadsby acknowledges that this cognitive leap expanded our working memories and enabled us to speculate about the past and the future. But there’s a more radically significant element in this new ‘cathedral of the mind’, as Stephen Mithen has called it. And Cadsby, I can’t help feeling, has missed it.
That element is metaphorical thinking.
“The metaphor,” said José Ortega y Gasset, “is probably the most fertile power possessed by man.” Metaphorical thinking has generated the massive potential for creativity that continues to drive our cognitive development. Where, I wonder, might metaphor might fit into Ted Cadsby’s splendidly articulated argument?
